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1 INTRODUCTION 
The demand for oil products throughout the world 
requires the oil and gas processing facilities to work 
at maximum efficiency. For example, according to 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration approx-
imately 93 million barrels of oil products were pro-
duced every day around the world in 2014 (U.S. En-
ergy Information Administration, 2014). Thus, the 
unexpected shutdowns of offshore oil and gas plants 
due to equipment failures result in big economic 
losses. 
One of such equipment is a three-phase separator 
(TPS), where a failure can cause the whole oil pro-
cessing plant to be stopped. TPSs are used to sepa-
rate water, gas and solid impurities from oil. Faults 
in TPS are commonly detected by using either 
thresholds of the process variables (Chan, 2005) 
(e.g. oil level, water level and etc.), statistical analy-
sis of the process variables (Roverso, 2002, Omana 
& Taylor, 2007, Taylor & Omana, 2008) or precise 
mathematical models (Dias et al., 1993, Kinnaert et 
al., 2000, Al-Hajri & Rossiter, 2010), which simu-
late the operation of the TPS and then compare its 
outputs with the readings of the actual TPS. 
The first commonly used approach usually de-
tects failures when their effect is already critical to 
the system and the shutting down of the TPS is una-
voidable. The second approach needs historical data, 
which might not be available, especially for hazard-
ous failure modes, since little data is available due to 
their rare occurrence. Finally, for the third approach, 
a very good understanding of process conditions is 
necessary and usually the model requires extensive 
changes, if operating conditions were due to change. 
A fault detection and diagnostic (FDD) method-
ology based on Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) 
technique for TPS is proposed in this paper. The 
BBNs are used for modelling systems usually con-
sisting of a number of different components and the 
complexity and uncertainty lies in the interactions 
between those components. For example aeroplane 
engines (Sahin et al., 2007) or water tank system 
(Lampis & Andrews, 2009). 
The BBN model was chosen due to several rea-
sons, including graphical representation of the mod-
elled system, inclusion of expert knowledge about 
failure modes of the system, ability to model uncer-
tainties in a probabilistic way, ability to build the 
model in a structured and modular way, and update 
the prior knowledge about occurrence of certain 
failure modes without altering the structure of the 
model. The proposed methodology can cope with 
multiple faults, takes into account the condition of 
the components throughout time and exploits the 
combinations of sensor readings in order to derive 
supplementary information about the processes in 
the TPS without the need to install additional sen-
sors. 
This paper reports on the development of the 
methodology (section 3) and its application to a TPS 
simulation model (section 4), when single and mul-
tiple faults are introduced. The BBN technique is 
briefly introduced next. 
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1.1 Bayesian Belief Networks 
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is a causal network 
that has a quantitative representation of causal links 
within the network (Jensen & Nielsen, 2007). A 
BBN consists of the following elements: 
 A set of variables with a finite set of mutually ex-
clusive states. 
 A set of directed edges between the variables, 
which have to form an acyclic directed graph. 
 Conditional probability tables (CPT), which ex-
press the causal relationships between the varia-
bles in a quantitative way. 
BBNs can be built in a modular way, for exam-
ple, in order to model the sections of the system that 
have an identical structure the same instance of BBN 
can be reused. BBNs that are built in a modular way, 
as in this study, are referred to as Object Oriented 
Bayesian Networks (OOBN) (Koller & Pfeffer, 
1997). 
It is common to represent the BBN graphically. 
The variables of BBN are depicted by elliptical 
nodes joined together by arrows. A specific graph-
ical notation that is used throughout this paper is 
given in Table 1. Note, that “Information node” and 
“Condition node” have different shadings in order to 
visually identify them in the BBN and is a non-
standard graphical representation. The basic princi-
ples of TPS operation, as well as the components of 
TPS, are presented in next section. 
 
Table 1. Graphical notation used in representing BBNs 
Node 
marking 
Name and purpose 
 
An “Instance node” is used to create a modular BBN. 
If certain parts of the BBN are repetitive these can be 
constructed as instances and then used throughout the 
BBN. 
 
An “Input node” is used to connect “Instance node” 
to other nodes in the BBN. Input nodes must be cho-
sen when a BBN, which is used as an instance node, 
is built. 
 
An “Output node” is used to provide an output (or 
multiple outputs) from the “Instance node“. 
 
An “Intermediate node” is used for intermediate cal-
culations and is neither input nor output nodes. 
 
An “Information node” is used to provide evidence in 
the BBN from sensor readings of the TPS. These 
nodes are coloured in pale green. 
 
A “Condition node” represents states of every com-
ponent of TPS (e.g. LT1 state, LC1 state) in the BBN 
and is used to monitor the state of the TPS given sen-
sor readings. These nodes are coloured in blue. 
2 THREE-PHASE SEPARATOR 
Three-phase separator (TPS) is an essential equip-
ment in the oil production and processing plant. The 
schematic of the TPS (Arnold & Stewart, 2008) is 
given in Figure 1. 
The TPS is used to separate gas and water from 
oil. The operational principle of the TPS is based on 
the laws of gravity: higher density material (e.g. wa-
ter) settles on the bottom of the TPS, while lower 
density material (e.g. gas and oil) flow to the top of 
TPS. A horizontal TPS with a weir is considered in 
this study, as it is a commonly used TPS due to good 
separation quality, low initial set-up costs and ease 
of maintenance. 
The TPS can be roughly split into several sec-
tions:  
 A liquid separation section, where the separation 
of water and oil occurs (the section to the left of 
the weir). 
 A separated oil section, where the separated oil 
flows over the weir from the liquid separation 
section (the section to the right of the weir). 
 A separated gas section, where the remaining 
space from two previous sections is left for the 
gas phase. 
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Figure 1. Horizontal three-phase separator schematic of con-
figuration with a weir 
 
The TPS is controlled by using PI controllers 
(Svrcek et al., 2006) to control the level of each 
phase (water level control loop is marked as a wavy 
rectangle, oil level control loop - as a dotted rectan-
gle and pressure level control loop - as a dashed rec-
tangle in Figure 1) in feedback control loops. 
Failure of the components of the TPS could lead 
to improper control and thus lead to undesirable 
events, such as overpressure, under pressure, liquid 
carryover, gas blowby (American Petroleum 
Institute, 2001). Alarms are set to be triggered for 
the oil, water and pressure when the levels are too 
high or too low in the TPS in order to prevent the 
undesirable events. 
2.1 Simulation model of a three-phase separator 
In order to demonstrate the proposed methodology a 
simulation model of the TPS is built in this study. 
The system models can capture the main operating 
conditions of real systems and provide several bene-
fits, when testing the FDD techniques (Dias et al., 
1993, Omana & Taylor, 2007): 
 Ease of modelling different failures, e.g. even 
hazardous failure modes. 
 Data is easily obtainable and the testing can be 
performed on a large number of different scenari-
os. 
 Low costs of implementing a simulation model, 
when compared to a scaled version of a real oper-
ating system. 
Software with a graphical user interface to model 
the operation of the TPS was written as a part of this 
study in order to obtain sensor readings from the 
TPS, while operating under normal operating condi-
tions and affected by failures. 
Selected failure modes are considered for the 
components of the TPS. They are summarised in 
Table 2. The TPS is simulated until a predefined 
simulation time runs out, an alarm is raised or an 
undesirable event occurs. Further details on the sim-
ulation model can be found in (Vileiniskis et al., 
2016). The proposed methodology is presented next. 
 
Table 2. Failure modes of components of a three-phase separa-
tor 
Component name Failure mode 
Flow transmitter (FT0, FT1, FT2, 
FT3) 
1 – Failed stuck (FS) 
Level transmitter (LT1, LT2, LT3) 1 – Failed stuck (FS) 
PI controller (LC1, LC2, LC3) 1 – Failed low (FL) 
2 – Failed high (FH) 
Control valve (CV1, CV2, CV3) 1 – Failed closed (FC) 
2 – Failed opened (FO) 
3 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
Fault detection and diagnostics methodology based 
on Bayesian Belief Networks is proposed in this pa-
per. The BBN model is developed in a modular way 
in order to replicate the undergoing processes in the 
TPS in each of the individual sections (an individual 
BBN is built for each section) before three separated 
liquids/gases, i.e. water, oil and gas, leave the vessel. 
Thus the final BBN is an OOBN model, as described 
in section 1.1. 
The operation of the TPS is split into consecutive 
time intervals (called time segments in this study) 
and the sensor readings obtained from the TPS dur-
ing these time intervals are fed into the OOBN. 
Analysis of the sensor readings with the OOBN is 
then performed and prediction on the most likely 
states of the components is made. 
FDD capabilities of the proposed methodology 
are tested by modelling failures in the TPS simula-
tion model and then using the outputs from the simu-
lation model as evidence in the BBN model infor-
mation nodes to obtain posterior probabilities of 
component failures in the corresponding condition 
nodes. An increase in the posterior probability of the 
failure mode of a particular component in the BBN 
will be considered as an indication of the presence of 
the failure of that component in the simulation mod-
el. 
3.1 Fusion of sensor readings 
One novelty of the proposed methodology is to 
combine the information from several sensors. In 
this way, supplementary data, such as changes of 
liquid/gas levels can be derived without a need to in-
stall additional sensors in the separator. The follow-
ing combinations of sensors are obtained: 
 FT0 water – FT1. Determines the water level 
change rate in the separation section and aids the 
FDD of transmitters FT0, FT1 and LT1. 
 FT0 water – FT1 + FT0 oil. Determines the total 
liquid level change rate in the separation section 
and aids the FDD of transmitters FT0, FT1 and 
LT1. 
 FT0 gas – FT3. Determines the gas change rate in 
the separator, which is used to identify pressure 
level change rate and aids the FDD of transmit-
ters FT0, FT3 and LT3. 
 FT0 water – FT1 + FT0 oil – FT2. Determines 
the volume change for gas in the separator and 
aids the FDD of FT0, FT1, FT2, LT1 and LT2. 
 LT1 + LT2 level changes. Determines the volume 
change for gas in the separator and aids the FDD 
of transmitters FT0, FT1, FT2, LT1 and LT2. 
For example, the combination “FT0 water – FT1” 
provides information on the water level change in 
the liquid separation section, which is also given by 
level transmitter LT1. This way, the sensor readings 
can be cross-checked to identify any discrepancies, 
which could indicate a possible failure of one of the 
components. 
3.2 BBN for a control loop 
A generic BBN for a control loop is given in Figure 
2. 
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Figure 2. BBN for a control loop "FTiD given level LTiD" 
 
It is built adhering to the logic that the infor-
mation flow would follow in a physical system: 
1 Level transmitter LTiD reads the information 
about the level of one of the phases and depend-
ing, on the state of the transmitter, sends this in-
formation to the controller LCiD. 
2 The controller LCiD in turn sends the correspond-
ing command (based on the state of the control-
ler) to the control valve CViD. 
3 The valve CViD opens according to its state and 
the command it received from the controller 
LCiD. 
4 Flow through valve CViD is indicated by a flow 
transmitter FTiD, which indicates the value based 
on the opening of the CViD and the state of the 
flow transmitter. 
3.3 BBN for the liquid separation section 
The BBN for the liquid separation section (see Fig-
ure 3) has an instance of the previously developed 
BBN “FTiD given level LTiD” (Figure 2), where it 
is used to represent the water control loop. 
The liquid separation section contains two phases 
(water and oil) flowing into the section and two 
phases flowing out of the section (separated oil is 
flowing over the weir to a separated oil section and 
separated water is leaving the TPS through valve 
CV1). The weir limits the total liquid amount in the 
section as well as the amount of the separated oil 
that is flowing into the next section. The BBN for 
this section is developed by considering the process 
of the liquid propagation through this section, as 
well as possible changes of liquid levels. 
An algorithm was developed to derive the CPTs 
for the nodes in this BBN and it is based on the 
arithmetic operations that have to be performed on 
the parent node information. For example, the CPT 
for the node “FT0 water – FT1” was derived by 
looping through possible water inflow and outflow 
values and calculating the difference between them. 
The information shown by the combination of 
transmitters then depends on the condition of both 
transmitters FT0 and FT1. For full details of the al-
gorithm refer to (Vileiniskis et al., 2016). 
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Figure 3. BBN for the liquid separation section 
3.4 BBN for the separated oil section 
The BBN built for the separated oil section is given 
in Figure 4. 
An instance of the control loop BBN “FT2 given 
level LT2” is used to model the control of oil level. 
The level of oil in the separated oil section depends 
on the amount of oil flowing from the liquid separa-
tion section (node “Oil inflow from the separation 
section”) and the amount of oil leaving the TPS 
through valve CV2 (node “Oil outflow from separa-
tor”). The change of oil level is observed through 
readings of transmitter LT2 (node “Oil level change 
rate in the separated oil section indicated by LT2”). 
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Figure 4. BBN for the separated oil section 
3.5 BBN for the separated gas section 
The BBN for the separated gas section is given in 
Figure 5. An instance of BBN for the control loop 
“FT3 given level LT3” is used to model the control 
of pressure level. This section is only considered to 
have gas flowing into the section and then gas leav-
ing the TPS through valve CV3. Differently from 
other phases (oil and water), gas is compressible. 
Thus the pressure level inside the TPS depends on 
the gas amount, as well as the volume that is availa-
ble for gas (nodes “Gas level change rate” and 
“Change of volume for gas in the separator” are 
made parents of a node “Pressure level change 
rate”). 
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Figure 5. BBN for the separated gas section 
3.6 BBN for the interactions between individual 
sections 
The BBN for the interactions between the individual 
sections, given in Figure 6, contains an instance of 
each individual section BBN (previously described 
in sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5). The individual sections 
are connected in the following way: 
 “Liquid separation section” is connected to “Sep-
arated oil section” by making the node “Flow 
over weir” as a parent node of a node “Oil inflow 
from the separation section”. 
 “Liquid separation section” and “Separated oil 
section” are connected to “Separated gas section” 
by making the nodes “Water inflow into separa-
tion section”, “Water outflow from separator”, 
“Oil inflow into separation section” and “Oil out-
flow from separator” as parent nodes of a node 
“Change of volume for gas in the separator”. 
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Figure 6. BBN for the interactions between individual sections “Single time segment” 
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Figure 7. Excerpt from a triple time segment OOBN for fault detection and diagnostics 
 
Two information nodes (“LT1 + LT2 level 
changes” and “FT0 water – FT1 + FT0 oil – FT2”) 
are used to input the information on how the volume 
available for gas changes in the TPS. The developed 
BBN is called “Single time segment” in this study, 
since it uses the sensor readings obtained from the 
TPS for single time segment, as explained at the be-
ginning section 3. 
3.7 Triple time segment BBN for fault detection and 
diagnostics 
A triple time segment OOBN (see an excerpt in 
Figure 7) is created by joining three instances of the 
“Single time segment” BBNs, given in Figure 6, to 
perform FDD of the TPS. The instances of “Single 
time segment” BBNs are labelled with suffixes “t-
3=>t-2”, “t-2=>t-1” and “t-1=>t” to indicate the time 
segment of the sensor readings that are used in the 
BBN. For example, if a time segment is 10 seconds 
long, then the “t-3=>t-2” means that the BBN uses 
the sensor readings from a time segment of 30 to 20 
seconds from the most recent readings. 
This OOBN is then used for the FDD of the TPS. 
The procedure can be summarised in the following 
steps: 
1 Enter the sensor readings into the OOBN. 
2 Update the posterior probabilities throughout the 
OOBN, given the new sensor readings. 
3 Track how the posterior probabilities of the con-
dition nodes in the most recent time segment 
changes (nodes with a suffix “t-1=>t”) in order to 
detect and identify failures of components (a 
threshold of posterior probabilities for FDD has 
to be set (Threshold 1)). 
4 Check if the posterior probabilities of the condi-
tion nodes significantly differ from the prior 
probabilities of the same condition nodes in adja-
cent time segments (a threshold is used to ignore 
very small differences between the prior and pos-
terior probabilities). 
5 If the difference between posterior and prior 
probabilities found in step 4 is significant, make 
posterior probabilities of the condition nodes as 
prior probabilities of the condition nodes in a 
previous time segment. 
6 Repeat the procedure described in steps 1 to 5 
when new sensor readings become available. 
Such an approach allows conditions of compo-
nents of the TPS to be monitored once sensor read-
ings become available for all three time segments 
following the initial start of the monitoring. 
For a more detailed description of each step as 
well as the details of CPTs quantification and the 
rules to build the section BBNs, refer to (Vileiniskis 
et al., 2016). 
4 APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY 
The methodology is applied to a simulation model of 
the TPS, when single and multiple faults are present 
in the TPS. The testing scenarios for both single and 
multiple faults are summarised in Table 3. Note that 
Threshold 1 and Threshold 2 in Table 3 are the 
thresholds necessary for FDD, as explained in sec-
tion 3.7 (steps 3 and 4, respectively). 
 
Table 3. Design of scenarios to test the FDD of OOBN with 
single and multiple faults 
Aspect Single faults Multiple faults 
Duration 600 seconds / alarm / undesirable event 
Failures inserted At 30, 40, 50, …, 500 seconds 
Lag between 
failures 
- 30 seconds 
Threshold 1 0.1 
Threshold 2 0.01 
 
For each correctly detected and diagnosed failure 
mode its detection and diagnostics potential is de-
termined using the following equation 
%,100
p
i
i
i
T
T
R  (1) 
where Ri is the ratio of FDD capability of a specific 
failure mode i, Ti
d
 is the time duration, when the 
BBN detected the presence of a failure mode i, Ti
p
 is 
the time duration the failure mode i was present in 
the simulation model. 
Similarly, the measure of false alarms is given as 
a ratio expressed using the following equation: 
%,100
t
iF
iF
T
T
R  (2) 
where RiF is the ratio of false alarm of a failure mode 
i, TiF is the time duration, when the BBN falsely de-
tected the presence of a failure mode i, Tt is the total 
time of simulation. 
The notation for the indices of ratios used in 
equations (1) and (2) is given in Table 4. The capa-
bilities of BBN for FDD of single faults are consid-
ered first. 
 
Table 4. Notation of failure modes 
Failure mode Index i / iF Failure mode Index i / iF 
FT0 FS 1 / 1F CV2 FC 11 / 11F 
LT1 FS 2 / 2F CV2 FO 12 / 12F 
LC1 FH 3F FT2 FS 13 / 13F 
LC1 FL 4F LT3 FS 14 / 14F 
CV1 FC 5 / 5F LC3 FH 15F 
CV1 FO 6 / 6F LC3 FL 16F 
FT1 FS 7 / 7F CV3 FC 17 / 17F 
LT2 FS 8 / 8F CV3 FO 18 / 18F 
LC2 FH 9F FT3 FS 19 / 19F 
LC2 FL 10F   
4.1 Fault detection and diagnostics of single faults 
All the single failure modes (except for the control-
ler faults (LC1 FL/FH, LC2 FL/FH and LC3 
FL/FH), since they have the same effect as failures 
of the corresponding valve, and thus it is impossible 
to distinguish between them) were inserted at differ-
ent time points during the execution of the simula-
tion in order to calculate the duration of detection 
lags of the faults. The results are summarised in Fig-
ure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. Fault detection duration for different failure modes, 
when single faults were inserted in the simulation model 
 
As one can observe from Figure 8, the average 
fault detection durations were no longer than 40 sec-
onds, which should give enough time for the opera-
tor to perform actions to prevent any undesirable 
event. The maximum fault detection duration was 
observed for the failure mode level transmitter LT2 
being failed stuck. In one case, this failure mode was 
only detected by the BBN model 130 seconds after it 
was inserted at 220 seconds into the simulation 
model. Even though the detection of the failure in 
this case took significantly longer than the average 
time (18.96 seconds), the failure was still detected 
approximately 60 seconds before the separated oil 
level reached the level, where it would raise an 
alarm if the level transmitter LT2 was not failed. 
Thus the methodology still gives an earlier indica-
tion of a failure than that provided by the alarm 
methods. 
 
Table 5. Summary of the FDD ratios, when a single fault has 
been inserted in the simulation model  
i Ri Additional faults detected, RiF 
1 76.43 - 
2 81.79 - 
5 90.12 R4F = 29.32 
6 89.89 R3F = 33.60, R19F = 1.06, R15F = R18F = 0.32  
7 74.32 R3F = R6F = 1.40, R4F = R5F = 1.26 
8 84.34 R2F = 0.17 
11 95.29 R10F = 25.30 
12 90.41 R9F = 20.46 
13 96.64 R10F = R11F = 0.25, R9F = R12F = 0.22 
14 92.66 - 
17 96.47 R16F = 42.43 
18 96.47 R15F = 41.27 
19 93.91 R15F = 1.33, R17F = 1.29, R16F = 1.15, R16F = 0.93  
The biggest challenge for the BBN model was the 
detection of transmitter failures (for example i = 1 
for FT0 FS and i = 7 for FT1 FS, where Ri was low-
est, in Table 5). This was due to the fact that the 
failure effect depends on the time of occurrence of 
the failure. In some cases the failure might be a hid-
den failure for a certain period of the simulation. 
However, the failure becomes hidden because of 
specific operating conditions and thus the perfor-
mance of any of the techniques for FDD would suf-
fer due to this phenomenon. 
The ratios RiF are very low (not higher than 1.4), 
except for the false diagnostics of controller failures, 
such as R4F = 29.32, when CV1 FC failure mode was 
inserted, but this occurred due to the nature of the 
controller failures, as explained at the beginning of 
section 4.1. 
4.2 Fault detection and diagnostics of multiple 
faults 
Two failure modes occurring in a single simulation 
run are modelled next. The multiple failures have 
been inserted in the simulation model in the follow-
ing way: first one of the level transmitter failures 
(LT1 FS, LT2 FS or LT3 FS) is introduced and then 
it is followed by one of the remaining possible fail-
ures (except for controller failures). In total, 36 
combinations of two failures were obtained giving a 
total of 1728 (failures are inserted at 48 time points) 
scenarios to test the capabilities of FDD with multi-
ple faults. Note that, only the results for combina-
tions with LT1 FS are presented in this section, as 
the same trends exist for failures LT2 FS and LT3 
FS. 
 
 
Figure 9. Fault detection duration for different failure modes, 
when multiple faults were inserted in simulation model 
 
The average detection durations of multiple faults 
are given in Figure 9. Note that, only a single fault 
label is given in the plot to avoid repeating the label 
LT1 FS. The difference from Figure 8 is that for the 
LT1 FS failure mode, the detection duration is aver-
aged through all of the 576 scenarios (since it was 
inserted together with all remaining 12 failure 
modes); whilst for other failure modes the duration 
is averaged through 48 scenarios. 
Detection lags have remained similar for most of 
the failure modes if compared to the single faults 
scenarios (see Figure 8). However, for the failure 
modes CV1 FO and FT1 FS, the average detection 
times have increased quite significantly (from 14.79 
to 97.71 seconds and from 20.62 to 130.62 seconds, 
respectively). When the individual scenarios with 
the longest detection durations were analysed in de-
tail, the findings suggested that: 
 Some of the failures are hidden failures due to the 
operating conditions of TPS at the time they oc-
cur. 
 The effect of failure mode LT1 FS hides the ef-
fect of failures of components that are associated 
or dependant on LT1, e.g. valve CV1. 
Similarly as for the single faults case, the results 
with multiple faults are summarised in Table 6 with 
FDD ratios as expressed by equations (1) and (2). 
 
Table 6. Summary of the FDD ratios, when multiple faults 
have been inserted in the simulation model  
i Ri R2 Additional faults detected, RiF 
1 68.03 73.33 
R7F = 0.99, R10F = 0.74, R13F = 0.69, R16F = 
R19F = 0.49, R11F = 0.39, R12F = 0.35, R8F = 
0.10, R9F = R15F = R18F = 0.30, R17F = 0.20 
5 72.08 82.37 
R4F = 21.15, R10F = R11F = R13F = 1.87, R19F = 
0.96, R16F = 0.64, R15F = R17F = R18F = 0.32 
6 51.95 88.48 
R3F = 22.08, R19F = 0.87, R8F = 0.35, 
R15F = R18F = 0.26 
7 11.32 81.79 
R10F = R11F = R13F = 0.64 
R3F = R4F = R5F = R6F = 0.20 
8 62.50 81.49 
R19F = 3.64, R13F = 2.34, R10F = R16F = R17F = 
2.14,  R11F = 2.09 R15F = R18F = 1.29 
11 75.71 77.54 R10F = 22.66, R16F = R17F = R19F = 1.86 
12 77.46 68.34 
R9F = 17.67, R18F = R19F = 2.81, R15F = 2.75, 
R13F = 1.43, R10F = R11F = 1.31 
R16F = R17F = 0.24 
13 71.29 81.79 R10F = 14.36, R11F = 14.21, R9F = R12F = 0.10 
14 76.38 81.79 - 
17 86.91 80.65 
R16F = 29.89, R19F = 1.32, R18F = 0.51, 
R15F = 0.10 
18 89.86 72.71 R15F = 21.85, R10F = R11F = R13F = 0.23 
19 73.55 81.79 
R16F = 7.05, R17F = 6.07, R18F = 5.08, R15F = 
4.83, R8F = 0.30, R7F = R14F = 0.05  
This time, the BBN falsely identified a bigger 
amount of failure modes when compared to the sin-
gle faults case (see Table 5). However, the ratios RiF 
are still reasonably low, except for the false diagnos-
tics of controller failures. The BBN encountered 
problems, when detecting the failure FT1 FS (i = 7 
in Table 6) together with LT1 FS. This was due to 
the fact that the flow transmitter FT1 always failed 
later than level transmitter LT1, thus the failure of 
FT1 FS had no effect on FT1 readings. This is just 
reconfirmed when looking at the numbers of unde-
tected faults during the tested scenarios. For each 
combination of faults (LT1 FS and a second fault) a 
number of scenarios (out of 48), when either of the 
faults were undetected, are summarised in Table 7. 
43 times out of 48 scenarios, the FT1 FS failure 
was undetected when inserted after failure mode 
LT1 FS. The failure of level transmitter LT1 has 
been detected in the majority of the scenarios (568 
out of 576). In 7 out of 8 scenarios when LT1 was 
undetected, the effect of second failure was immedi-
ate and the TPS simulation model ran only for a few 
time steps before an alarm was raised due to a too 
low/high separated oil level, and the simulation 
model was stopped before the failure of LT1 could 
be detected (average detection time for a single fault 
was 32.29 seconds), since the water level in the liq-
uid separation section remained around set point as 
expected. 
The BBN model has failed to detect the failures 
of components that are in the same control loop as 
the LT1 in a lot of scenarios, for example, FT1 FS 
(43 out of 48) or CV1 FO (24 out of 48). This was 
due to the hidden failures, when the second fault has 
no effect on the TPS, because of the first fault, as 
explained previously. However, note that there were 
no scenarios where both of the failures would be left 
undetected during the same simulation run, as they 
were undetected in separate simulation runs. 
 
Table 7. Summary of undetected failures, when multiple faults 
(Fault 1 – LT1 FS) were inserted in the simulation model 
Fault 2 Fault 1 Fault 2 Fault 2 Fault 1 Fault 2 
FT0 FS 1 0 CV2 FO 5 4 
CV1 FC 0 19 FT2 FS 0 11 
CV1 FO 0 24 LT3 FS 0 3 
FT1 FS 0 43 CV3 FC 0 1 
LT2 FS 0 9 CV3 FO 0 2 
CV2 FC 2 7 FT3 FS 0 1 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, several novel aspects were proposed 
for the fault detection and diagnostics of a three-
phase separator. The proposed methodology is built 
in a modular way; it also takes into account the con-
dition of components in previous time segments, ex-
ploits the combinations of transmitter readings and 
includes detection and diagnostics of multiple failure 
modes. FDD of multiple failure modes is a major 
improvement when compared to the previously-
proposed approaches. 
One of the important features that could extend 
the proposed methodology is leak detection, as in 
some cases it might be a critical failure of the TPS. 
The proposed methodology is based on monitoring 
the changes of the liquid/gas in the three-phase sepa-
rator using sensor readings and does not take into 
account the actual levels of liquid/gas (except when 
a PI controller output is calculated). The addition of 
actual levels of liquids/gas and their propagation 
from one time segment to another could be also in-
cluded in the methodology. Another extension to the 
proposed methodology could be to include model-
ling other component failure modes, for example, 
valve being stuck half open/closed, and optimising 
the choice of thresholds for the FDD process. 
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